You are seeing this message because your Web browser does not support basic Web standards. Find out more about why this message is appearing and what you can do to make your experience on this site better.


ABOUT JAMA
Advanced Search

Welcome   | My Account | E-mail Alerts | Access Rights | Sign In


  Vol. 278 No. 5, August 6, 1997 TABLE OF CONTENTS
  JAMA
  •  Online Features
  Policy Perspectives
 This Article
 •References
 •Full text PDF
 •PDF
 •Send to a friend
 • Save in My Folder
 •Save to citation manager
 •Permissions
 Citing Articles
 •Citation map
 •Citing articles on HighWire
 •Contact me when this article is cited
 Related Content
 •Similar articles in JAMA
 Topic Collections
 •Bioterrorism
 •Alert me on articles by topic
 Social Bookmarking
  Add to CiteULike Add to Connotea Add to Del.icio.us Add to Digg Add to Reddit Add to Technorati Add to Twitter What's this?

Biological Weapons Control

Prospects and Implications for the Future

Robert P. Kadlec, MD, MTM&H; Allan P. Zelicoff, MD; Ann M. Vrtis, MD

JAMA. 1997;278(5):351-356.


Abstract

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), which prohibits the acquisition of biological materials for hostile purposes and armed conflict, entered into force in 1975 and now has the participation of 140 nations (158 nations have signed the BWC, but only 140 of these have also ratified it). However, there is no monitoring mechanism associated with the BWC. Diplomatic efforts are now under way to create a supplemental, legally binding protocol to strengthen the convention. Measures to strengthen the BWC are analogous to the diagnostic processes familiar to physicians; the problem facing negotiators is to identify procedures with high positive and negative predictive value. Few proposed measures meet these criteria. However, the investigation of unusual disease outbreaks and allegations of use are highly diagnostic of illicit activities while avoiding false-positive accusations. At the same time, such information generated by the BWC can contribute to worldwide efforts to improve public health, control emergent disease, and establish an international norm against biological weapons proliferation.



Author Affiliations

From the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC (Dr Kadlec); Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (Dr Zelicoff); and the Department of Anesthesiology, Malcolm Grow Medical Center, Andrews Air Force Base, Md (Dr Vrtis).


Footnotes

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors exclusively and do not represent the official position of the US government, the US Department of Defense, the US Department of Energy, the US Air Force, or Sandia National Laboratories.

Reprints: Robert P. Kadlec, MD, MTM&H, 11701 Tuscany Dr. Laurel, MD 20708.



Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter     What's this?

THIS ARTICLE HAS BEEN CITED BY OTHER ARTICLES

Bioterrorism
Bellamy and Freedman
QJM 2001;94:227-234.
FULL TEXT  

Poxvirus Dilemmas -- Monkeypox, Smallpox, and Biologic Terrorism
Breman and Henderson
NEJM 1998;339:556-559.
FULL TEXT  

Infectious Disease and Biological Weapons: Prophylaxis and Mitigation
Lederberg
JAMA 1997;278:435-436.
ABSTRACT  





HOME | CURRENT ISSUE | PAST ISSUES | TOPIC COLLECTIONS | CME | SUBMIT | SUBSCRIBE | HELP
CONDITIONS OF USE | PRIVACY POLICY | CONTACT US | SITE MAP
 
© 1997 American Medical Association. All Rights Reserved.