You are seeing this message because your Web browser does not support basic Web standards. Find out more about why this message is appearing and what you can do to make your experience on this site better.


ABOUT JAMA
Advanced Search

Welcome   | My Account | E-mail Alerts | Access Rights | Sign In


  Vol. 286 No. 1, July 4, 2001 TABLE OF CONTENTS
  JAMA
  •  Online Features
  Health Law and Ethics
 This Article
 •Full text
 •PDF
 •Send to a friend
 • Save in My Folder
 •Save to citation manager
 •Permissions
 Citing Articles
 •Citation map
 •Citing articles on HighWire
 •Citing articles on Web of Science (8)
 •Contact me when this article is cited
 Related Content
 •Related letter
 •Similar articles in JAMA
 Topic Collections
 •Medical Practice
 •Law and Medicine
 •Alert me on articles by topic
 Social Bookmarking
  Add to CiteULike Add to Connotea Add to Del.icio.us Add to Digg Add to Reddit Add to Technorati Add to Twitter What's this?

An Analysis of Physician Antitrust Exemption Legislation

Adjusting the Balance of Power

Fred J. Hellinger, PhD; Gary J. Young, PhD,JD

JAMA. 2001;286:83-88.

Current antitrust law restricts physicians from joining together to collectively negotiate. However, such activities may be approved by state laws under the so-called state action immunity doctrine and by federal legislation under an explicit antitrust exemption.

In 1999, Texas became the first state to pass physician antitrust exemption legislation allowing physicians, under certain defined circumstances, to collectively negotiate fees with health plans. Last year, similar legislation was introduced in the US Congress, in 18 state legislatures, and in the District of Columbia. This legislation was passed only in the District of Columbia where its implementation was blocked by the city's financial control board. Nonetheless, legislation permitting physicians to collectively negotiate fees with managed care plans has been introduced in 10 state legislatures this year, and there is continued interest in introducing similar legislation in the US Congress. This analysis examines the basic features of this legislation and its potential impact on the balance of power between physicians and managed care plans.


Author Affiliations: Center for Organization and Delivery Studies, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, Md (Dr Hellinger); and Management Decision and Research Center, Veterans Affairs Health Services Research and Development Service, and Program on Health Policy and Management, School of Public Health, Boston University, Boston, Mass (Dr Young).



Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter     What's this?

RELATED LETTER

Economic Consequences of Collective Bargaining by Physicians
Gary Birnbaum, Stephen Foreman, David Emmons, Gregory Wozniak, Fred J. Hellinger, and Gary J. Young
JAMA. 2001;286(15):1837-1839.
EXTRACT | FULL TEXT  


THIS ARTICLE HAS BEEN CITED BY OTHER ARTICLES

The Federal Trade Commission, Clinical Integration, and the Organization of Physician Practice
Casalino
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 2006;31:569-585.
ABSTRACT  

Critical Issues In Hospital Antitrust Law
Hammer and Sage
Health Aff (Millwood) 2003;22:88-100.
ABSTRACT | FULL TEXT  

Why Competition Law Matters To Health Care Quality
Sage et al.
Health Aff (Millwood) 2003;22:31-44.
ABSTRACT | FULL TEXT  

Economic Consequences of Collective Bargaining by Physicians
Birnbaum et al.
JAMA 2001;286:1837-1839.
FULL TEXT  

Collective Bargaining by Physicians -- Labor Law, Antitrust Law, and Organized Medicine
Choudhry and Brennan
NEJM 2001;345:1141-1144.
FULL TEXT  





HOME | CURRENT ISSUE | PAST ISSUES | TOPIC COLLECTIONS | CME | SUBMIT | SUBSCRIBE | HELP
CONDITIONS OF USE | PRIVACY POLICY | CONTACT US | SITE MAP
 
© 2001 American Medical Association. All Rights Reserved.