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Laboratory Containment of Wild Poliovirus
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To the Editor: A recent Medical News and Perspectives story reports that the global effort to eradicate poliovirus is 99% complete.1 However, attention recently has been drawn to potential problems with global eradication,2 including reintroduction of wild virus into a country free of circulating wild virus, reversion of the vaccine strain to a more neurotropic form of the virus and subsequent infection with this reverted strain, persistence of the virus in the environment, and failure to maintain adequate immunization levels.
Another theoretical possibility is the escape of wild virus from the laboratory. The last documented case of smallpox in the world was due to a laboratory infection3 and this could happen with poliovirus. Being aware of this possibility, the World Health Organization (WHO) has developed a framework for the laboratory containment of wild poliovirus and materials that may be potentially infectious for wild poliovirus.4 However, recent experience in Australia suggests . . . [Full Text of this Article] Methods
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