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Joan Stephenson, PhD

JAMA. 2002;287:706.

Prompted by heightened fears of bioterrorism in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks and anthrax-tainted mail in the United States, the World Health Organization's executive board is recommending retaining indefinitely the current stockpiles of smallpox virus at laboratories in the United States and Russia—reversing a previous call for the destruction of the samples by the end of 2002 (report available on line at http://www.who.int/gb/EB_WHA/E/E_Index.htm).

The agency's advisory committee on variola virus research recommended retaining the virus to aid studies of new vaccines or treatments. Since smallpox was eradicated in nature in 1980, samples of the virus have been maintained at laboratories at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta and a Russian facility in Siberia. In recent years, however, there have been fears that inadequate security measures at the Russian laboratory may have allowed so-called rogue nations to obtain the virus.

In May, the World Health Assembly is expected to approve the recommendation and other measures aimed at improving disease surveillance and response mechanisms to prevent and respond to the deliberate use of biological and chemical agents to cause harm.

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